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ABSTRACT 
 
Per oltre trent’anni il diritto inglese ha previsto che laddove due concorrenti avessero la comune intenzione 
di commettere un certo reato ma uno di essi commettesse un reato diverso, l’altro rispondesse penalmente per i 
fatti commessi dal primo laddove avesse previsto la possibilità che questi avrebbe potuto agire come di fatto ha 
agito. Il principio si basava sull’equazione fra previsione e intenzione. La recente decisione della Corte 
Suprema del Regno Unito nei casi congiunti Jogee e Ruddock cambia il diritto riaffermando il più antico 
principio per cui l’elemento soggettivo richiesto per il concorrente secondario è pur sempre il dolo di assistere 
o incoraggiare il concorrente primario nella commissione del reato. Previsione non equivale ad autorizzazione. 
La decisione ha l’effetto di ricondurre l’elemento soggettivo del concorrente secondario a parità con quello 
richiesto per il concorrente primario e di restringere l’ambito della punibilità. Inoltre, può essere di stimolo per 
i giuristi e il legislatore italiano per intraprendere un profondo ripensamento della disciplina del tanto 
dibattuto concorso anomalo. 
 
For more than thirty years the English law established that whenever two defendants had a common 
intention to commit a particular crime, but one of them committed another crime, the other party was criminally 
liable for the acts by the primary offender if he had foreseen the possibility that he might have acted as he did. 
The principle was based on the equation between foresight and intent. The recent decision of the UK Supreme 
Court in the joint cases Jogee and Ruddock changes the law, by restating the older principle according to which 
the mental element required of a secondary party is an intention to assist or encourage the principal to commit 
the crime. Foresight is not equivalent to authorisation. This decision has the effect of bringing the mental 
element of the secondary party back into broad parity with what is required of the principal and of narrowing 
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the scope of criminal law. It can also stimulate Italian lawyers and law-makers to start a thorough rethinking of 
the law of the much-debated concorso anomalo. 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. The Italian and the English law of complicity in a nutshell. – 2.1. A 
brief comparison between the Italian law of the concorso anomalo nel reato and the English law of parasitic 
accessory liability. – 3. The Jogee case. The facts. – 3.1. The decision. - 3.2. The principles of secondary 
liability as restated by the Supreme Court. – 3.3. The effect of the Jogee decision on past convictions. – 4. 
Conclusions. 
 
1. Introduction. – One of the most problematic issues in the English law of complicity is 
the so-called parasitic accessory liability. The expression, coined in 1997 by John Smith
1
, 
indicates those cases in which two defendants have a common intention to commit a 
particular crime, but one of them, as an incident of committing that crime, commits another 
crime and the other has foreseen the possibility that he might do so
2
. The main problem is 
posed by the mens rea required for considering the secondary party criminally responsible for 
the different crime committed by the principal offender. 
During the years the English courts have given different answers to this question, reaching 
a seemingly definitive solution in the case Chang Wing-Siu
3
, in which the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council decreed that a secondary party is criminally liable for acts by the 
primary offender of a type which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend. The 
principle, based on a debatable equation between foresight and intent, was later reprised and 
developed by the House of Lords (now UK Supreme Court) – notably in the case R v Powell 
and R v English
4
, and thus it became law. The decision of 18 February 2016 of the UK 
Supreme Court in the joint cases R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) and Ruddock v The Queen
5
, 
hailed by the Criminal Bar Association as a «masterpiece of modern legal reasoning»
6
, 
changes the law, by restating the principle, well-established before Chang Wing-Siu, that the 
mental element required of a secondary party is an intention to assist or encourage the 
principal to commit the crime. Foresight is not equivalent to authorisation.  
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The present article has three purposes: (i) offering a short outline of the English law of 
complicity and of the Jogee decision, especially to the benefit of Italian lawyers; (ii) offering 
a short outline of the Italian law of complicity, especially to the benefit of non-Italian 
lawyers; (iii) trying to draw from Jogee suggestions for a possible rethinking of the Italian 
law of the so-called concorso anomalo nel reato. Therefore, the analysis of the Jogee 
decision will be conducted in the particular perspective of comparative law – which should 
also give it an element of originality compared to the many comments published so far
7
. As a 
matter of choice, given the economy of this work, bibliographic references will be limited to 
few essential contributions to the most relevant topics, to the purpose of giving a first 
orientation of the readers who are not familiar with either of the considered legal systems. 
 
2. The Italian and the English law of complicity in a nutshell. – Unlike the Italian law of 
complicity
8
, which does not differentiate between the possible forms of participation
9
, the 
English law
10
 distinguishes principals – the actual perpetrators of the crime – from secondary 
parties (or accessories or accomplices) – those who assist or encourage the principals to 
commit a crime. However, both Italian and English law of complicity are based on a similar 
fundamental principle, that is, that all the participants in a crime are considered guilty of that 
offence. In Italy, the principle is affirmed by article 110 of the penal code (c.p.)
11
, according 
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to which those who take part to the commission of a crime are subjected to the penalties 
established by the law for that crime. In England, the principle is stated in section 8 of the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
12
, which provides that: «Whosoever shall aid, abet, 
counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence
13
 … shall be liable to be tried, 
indicted and punished as a principal offender». 
The distinction between aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring is not a legislative 
differentiation between possible degrees of involvement. There is a substantial degree of 
overlap between the four behaviours, to the extent that it is generally accepted that they might 
be easily reduced to two: assisting and encouraging
14
. These roughly correspond to the two 
main forms of complicity recognised in Italian criminal law: the material and moral 
participation in crime (concorso materiale e morale). Secondly, there is no statutory 
connection between the modalities of participation listed in section 8 and the severity of 
punishment. Common law’s typically pragmatic approach makes it a matter of prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion, allowing for a sentencing flexibility which can punish accessories as 
severely, more severely or less severely than perpetrators
15
. Incidentally, also Italian law 
provides for a certain judicial discretion in the determination of the punishment of the 
participants in crime, establishing that instigators, promoters, organisers and directors of the 
cooperation in crime or persons who uses innocent agents (art. 111 c.p.) can be punished 
more severely and that, on the contrary, those whose participation has had a minimal 
importance in the preparation or the commission of the crime and those who have been 
determined to commit the crime by instigators taking advantage of a particular position can 
be punished less severely (art. 115 c.p.)
16
. 
In the English criminal law, accessory liability requires proof of a conduct element 
accompanied by the necessary mental element
17
. The conduct element is that the secondary 
offender has encouraged or assisted the commission of the offence by the principal. The 
mental element would be an intention to assist or encourage the commission of the crime, 
which requires knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be criminal
18
. The intention 
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to assist or encourage does not need to be specific to a particular offence, but it can be 
referred to a range of offences. If so, the accessory does not have to know (or intend) in 
advance the specific form which the crime will take, provided that the offence committed by 
the principal is within the range of possible offences which the accessory intentionally 
assisted or encouraged him to commit
19
. Similarly, according to Italian criminal law, the 
liability of participants in crime requires both a conduct and a mental element. The former is 
some form of (material or moral) contribution to the causation of the crime. The latter 
includes two components: on the one hand, the intent (dolo, which comprises both knowledge 
and intention) of the crime to be committed; on the other hand, the intention to participate to 
the commission of that crime together with other parties
20
. Like in English criminal law, this 
intention does not need to be specific to a particular offence, but could be referred to a range 
of alternative offences (so-called dolo alternativo). 
Neither Italian nor English law requires a previous agreement between the participants in 
crime.   
 
2.1. A brief comparison between the Italian law of the concorso anomalo nel reato and the 
English law of parasitic accessory liability. – A problem arises as to one party’s liability 
where another party has allegedly gone beyond the scope of the illegal course of conduct to 
which the former intended to participate. 
In Italy such cases fall under the legal framework of the «reato diverso da quello voluto da 
taluno dei concorrenti» (literally, crime different than that wanted by one of the 
participants)
21
, also called concorso anomalo (anomalous complicity) set forth by article 116 
c.p., according which, when the committed crime is different than that intended by one of the 
participants in a criminal enterprise, the latter is liable for such crime together with the actual 
perpetrator, whenever the harmful event is a consequence of his action or omission. The 
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judge can punish less severely the offender who intended to commit a less serious crime than 
the one actually perpetrated. 
Like the English law of parasitic accessory liability, this disposition has always very 
problematic with regard to the mental element required for the criminal liability of the 
participant who did not intend to commit the different crime perpetrated by another party, as 
it seemed to found such liability on mere causation, without requiring any particular mental 
state, to the extent that many suspected it to be a case of responsabilità oggettiva (strict 
liability). Such a form of liability contrasts with the Italian Constitution, which, in 
establishing the principle of personal criminal responsibility (art. 27), forbids any criminal 
liability for acts ascribable, subjectively and objectively, to others. The Italian Supreme Court 
(Corte di cassazione) and the Constitutional Court
22
 intervened to prevent that the much-
criticised norm could lead to unconstitutional forms of strict liability, by stating that in order 
for the party to be held criminally liable for the different crime perpetrated by another a 
coefficient of blameworthiness is still required. This would consist in the possibility for the 
former offender to contemplate the crime committed by the latter as a logically foreseeable 
development («sviluppo logicamente prevedibile») of the crime that the former intended to 
commit. 
This mental state would be framed within the paradigm of negligence (colpa)
23
, consisting 
in the violation of precautionary rules in relying on the activity of others in order to commit 
the crime originally intended
24
. The party who did not want the different crime committed by 
another participant is liable for that crime because he could and he should have foreseen it 
and he could and should have refrained from contributing to it. This liability is founded on 
foreseeability, rather than on foresight. In fact, Italian courts agree that whenever one of the 
parties to a criminal venture actually foresees and accepts the risk of the different crime 
committed by another party, he authorises and intends to participate to that crime, according 
to the paradigm of dolo eventuale, a highly discussed form of intent based on the equation 
between foresight and acceptance of the risk of a harmful criminal event and intent of causing 
it. In this case, the party who accepts the risk of a different crime committed by another 
participant in the criminal enterprise, would be criminally liable according to the general rule 
set by article 110, as he would be considered to satisfy both the requirements of the conduct 
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element and the mental element of intent (dolo). The anomaly of the particular case of 
complicity envisaged by article 116 stays, therefore, in that a criminal liability intentional in 
nature – and, as such, carrying a more serious stigma and capable of being punished more 
severely – is attached to a negligent attitude and behaviour25. In other words, the offender 
who did not intend, nor even foresee the crime different than that originally planned or 
agreed, is held liable for the different crime as if he intended to commit it, whenever it is 
considered to be a logically foreseeable ordinary development of the original crime he 
intended to commit. This implies, however, that liability is excluded whenever the different 
crime is an exceptional and unpredictable development of the criminal venture as originally 
intended
26
. 
The framework of the English law of parasitic accessory liability is partly different
27
. 
In his Crown Law, firstly published in 1762, Sir Michael Foster suggested an objective 
test, according to which, unless the principal did totally and substantially varied the original 
terms of the joint enterprise
28
, the other party should be criminally liable, as an accessory, for 
the crime committed by the principal whenever such crime was a «probable consequence of 
what was ordered or advised»
29
.  This approach bears some resemblance with the current 
Italian law. But Foster was writing about the law in the mid-18
th
 century. English cases in the 
19
th
 century showed a significant change of approach. It became no longer sufficient for the 
prosecution to prove that the principal’s conduct was a probable consequence, in the ordinary 
course of things, of the criminal enterprise instigated or agreed to by the secondary. The 
prosecution had to prove that it was part of their common purpose, should the occasion arise. 
The principle was firstly affirmed in R v Collison and later followed by other decisions
30
.  
Particular focus was posed on the evidential relevance of the carrying of a weapon on a 
criminal venture. In a line of cases the courts recognised that even where there was a joint 
intent to use weapons to overcome resistance or avoid arrest, the participants might not share 
an intent to cause death or really serious harm. If the principal had that intent and caused the 
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death of another he would be guilty of murder, which requires the intention to kill or cause 
serious bodily harm. Another party who lacked that intent, but took part in an attack which 
resulted in an unlawful death, would be not guilty of murder but of manslaughter, which 
require lesser forms of blameworthiness than murder. However, the courts agreed that when 
the act which caused the death was «wholly beyond the defendant’s contemplation»31, so as 
to be an «overwhelming supervening event»
32
, then the party lacking the intention to kill or 
causing serious bodily harm could not be considered as having authorised such event and, 
therefore, should not be held criminally liable
33
. 
This framework changed radically with Chan Wing-Siu. The three appellants were all 
convicted of murder of a man and wounding his wife with intent to cause grievous bodily 
during a robbery in their flat, to which they went each armed with a knife. The Court of 
appeal dismissed the appeals, as there was overwhelming evidence that the appellants 
foresaw the likelihood of resistance and that their plan included the possible use of knives to 
cause serious harm. However, the Privy Council upheld the convictions on the different 
«principle whereby a secondary party is criminally liable for acts by the primary offender of a 
type which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend. That there is such a principle 
is not in doubt. It turns on contemplation or, putting the same idea in other words, 
authorisation, which may be express but is more usually implied. It meets the case of a crime 
foreseen as a possible incident of the common unlawful enterprise. The criminal liability lies 
in participating in the venture with that foresight». Precedents of the Privy Council are not 
binding on English courts, but the principle was later restated by the House of Lords in R v 
Powell and R v English: «it is sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary 
party to have realised that in the course of the joint enterprise the primary party might kill 
with intent to do so or with intent to cause grievous bodily harm».  
The turn in the law was impressive: contemplation (foresight) was not any more evidence 
of, but equated authorisation (intent). The English system of secondary liability made a step 
towards the Italian legal system of concorso anomalo, by allowing a secondary who did not 
have any intent (to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm) to be held liable for a crime of 
intent (murder) committed by another, only because he foresaw the possibility of such crime, 
instead to being held liable for a crime requiring a lesser form of blameworthiness 
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(manslaughter) actually attributable to the secondary due to his foresight. Still, the English 
law differed from the Italian law in that it equated foresight, not foreseeability, to intent.  
 
3. The Jogee case. The facts. – With the Jogee decision, the UK Supreme Court impresses 
a new turn – a right one – to the English law of secondary liability.  
The decision concerns the joint cases of the appellants Jogee
34
 and Ruddock
35
.  
Jogee was convicted at Nottingham Crown Court of the murder of Paul Fyfe. In the early 
hours of 10 June 2011 the appellant and his co-defendant, Mohammed Hirsi, after having 
taken drink and drugs and become increasingly intoxicated and aggressive, visited several 
times Ms Naomi Reid’s house, who told them to leave. During the last visit Hirsi entered the 
house and had an angry confrontation with Mr Fyfe, Ms Reid’s boyfriend. From outside, 
Jogee shouted to Hirsi to do something to Mr Fyfe and threatened Mr Fyfe to smash a bottle 
over his head. Hirsi took a knife from the kitchen and stabbed Fyfe to death. 
Ruddock was convicted in the Circuit Court at Montego Bay, Jamaica, of the murder of 
Peter Robinson, committed by the co-defendant Hudson in the course of robbing him of his 
station wagon. Under caution, Ruddock admitted he was involved in committing the robbery 
and he was present when Hudson killed the victim but denied to be responsible for the 
killing. 
In each case the direction to the jury derived from Chan Wing-Siu and Powell and English, 
as the trial judges directed the jury that the defendants were guilty of murder if they took part, 
respectively, in the attack and the robbery and knew that it was possible that the respective 
co-defendants might act as they did with intent to cause serious harm or kill. 
 
3.1. The decision. – According to Law Lords, with Chan Wing-Siu the law «took a wrong 
turn». The Chan Wing-Siu principle cannot be supported, as its introduction was based on an 
incomplete, and in some respects erroneous, reading of the previous case law, coupled with 
generalised and questionable policy arguments. Moreover, far from being well-established 
and working satisfactorily, the principle remained highly controversial and a source of 
difficulty for trial judges, leading to large numbers of appeals. 
In Jogee the Supreme Court conducted a far deeper and more extensive review of the topic 
of so-called joint enterprise liability than on past occasions. In Chan Wing-Siu only two 
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English cases were referred to in the judgment – Anderson and Morris and Davies36. More 
were referred to in Powell and English, but they did not include (among others) Collison, 
Skeet, Spraggett or Reid, which, according to the Law Lords, did not support the Chang 
Wing-Siu principle. Indeed, these decisions represented a «progressive move away from the 
historic tendency of the common law to presume as a matter of law that the “natural and 
probable consequences” of a man’s act were intended, culminating in England and Wales in 
its statutory removal by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967». Since then, in the 
common law foresight may be evidence of intention, but it is not synonymous with it. Its 
adoption as a test for the mental element for murder in the case of a secondary party «is a 
serious and anomalous departure from the basic rule». «Murder already has a relatively low 
mens rea threshold, because it includes an intention to cause serious injury, without intent to 
kill or to cause risk to life. The Chan Wing-Siu principle extends liability for murder to a 
secondary party on the basis of a still lesser degree of culpability, namely foresight only of 
the possibility that the principal may commit murder but without there being any need for 
intention to assist him to do so».  
The Supreme Court clarifies that, as the doctrine of secondary liability is a common law 
doctrine and it has been unduly widened by the courts, it is proper for the courts, rather than 
Parliament, to correct the error. However, such a correction is consistent with Parliament’s 
approach both in section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (referred above) and in section 
44(2) of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which, in introducing the inchoate offence of 
intentionally encouraging or assisting crime, expressly provides that a person who does an act 
capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence «is not to be taken to have 
intended to encourage or assist the commission of an offence merely because such 
encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act». 
 
3.2. The principles of secondary liability as restated by the Supreme Court. – The UK 
Supreme Court used this occasion to restate, as nearly and clearly as possible, the principles 
of secondary liability, which can be summarised and systematised as follows. 
1) Prosecution does not need to prove whether a defendant was principal or accessory. It is 
sufficient to prove that he participated in the crime in one way or another.  
2) The requisite conduct element is that the secondary has assisted or encouraged the 
commission of the crime. Such participation may take many forms. Association with the 
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principal and the presence at the scene of the crime are likely to be very relevant evidence 
that assistance or encouragement was provided. Nevertheless, neither association nor 
presence is necessarily proof of assistance or encouragement; it depends on the facts
37
. 
3) Once encouragement or assistance is proved to have been given, the prosecution does 
not need to prove that it had a positive effect on the principal’s conduct or on the outcome38.  
4) The requisite mental element is an intention to assist or encourage the principal to 
commit the crime, acting with whatever mental element the offence requires of the principal. 
5) Intention to assist is not the same as desiring the crime to be committed. On the 
contrary, the intention to assist, and indeed the intention that the crime should be committed, 
may be conditional. It is a question of fact for the jury to infer from the facts and 
circumstances proved whether the principal’s act was within the scope of the plan to which 
the secondary gave his assent and intentional support – that is, whether the secondary 
expressly or tacitly agreed to a common purpose to commit a crime which included the 
principal going as far as he did, and committing another crime, if the occasion arose. 
6) Liability as an aider or abettor does not necessarily depend on there being some form of 
agreement between the defendants; it depends on proof of intentional assistance or 
encouragement, conditional or otherwise. If a person joins with a group which he realises is 
out to cause serious injury, the jury may well infer that he intended to encourage or assist the 
deliberate infliction of serious bodily injury and/or intended that that should happen if 
necessary. In that case, if the principal acts with intent to cause serious bodily injury and 
death results, both he and the secondary will each be guilty of murder. If a person is a party to 
a violent attack on another, without an intent to assist in the causing of death or really serious 
harm, or if he participates in any other unlawful act which all sober and reasonable people 
would realise carried the risk of some harm (not necessarily serious) to another, and death in 
fact results, he will be not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter
39
. The test is objective.  
7) It is possible for death to be caused by some overwhelming supervening act by the 
perpetrator which nobody in the defendant’s shoes could have contemplated might happen 
and is of such a character as to relegate his acts to history; in that case the defendant will bear 
no criminal responsibility for the death
40
.  
                                                          
37
 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 540, 558. 
38
 R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808. 
39
 R v Church [1965] 1 QB 59, approved in Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury [1977] AC 500 and 
recently re-affirmed in R v F (J) & E (N) [2015] EWCA Crim 351; [2015] 2 Cr App R 5. 
40
 Smith (Wesley), cit. and Anderson and R v Morris, cit. 
8) This type of case apart, what matters is whether the secondary encouraged or assisted 
the crime. He need not encourage or assist a particular way of committing it, although he may 
sometimes do so. In particular, his intention to assist in a crime of violence is not determined 
only by whether he knows what kind of weapon the principal has in his possession. The 
tendency which has developed in the application of the rule in Chan Wing-Siu to focus on 
what the secondary knew of what weapon the principal was carrying can and should give way 
to an examination of whether the secondary intended to assist in the crime charged. 
9) Where the offence charged does not require mens rea, the only mens rea required of the 
secondary party is that he intended to encourage or assist the perpetrator to do the prohibited 
act, with knowledge of any facts and circumstances necessary for it to be a prohibited act
41
. 
 
3.3. The effect of the Jogee decision on past convictions. – The decision inevitably carries 
important issues of inter-temporal law, which is not possible here to consider extensively.  
In short, in the Supreme Court’s words, the effect of «putting the law right» is not to 
render invalid all convictions arrived at over many years by applying the law as laid down in 
Chan Wing-Siu and in Powell and English. The error identified is important as a matter of 
legal principle, but it does not follow that it will have been important on the facts to the 
outcome of the trial or to the safety of the conviction. Moreover, where a conviction has been 
arrived at by faithfully applying the law as it stood at the time, it can be set aside only by 
seeking exceptional leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out of time. However, the Court of 
Appeal will not grant leave simply because the law applied has now been declared to have 
been mistaken. According to a principle consistently applied by English courts for many 
years, the fact that there has been an apparent change in the law or that previous 
misconceptions have been put right, does not afford a proper ground for allowing an 
extension of time in which to appeal against conviction
42
.  
As for the two particular cases of Jogee and Ruddock, the convictions for murder must, of 
course, be set aside because the law was wrongly understood and the appeals were brought in 
time. Nevertheless, in Jogee the Court considered that he was unquestionably guilty at least 
of manslaughter and there was evidence on which the jury could have found him guilty of 
murder on a proper direction (as he was brandishing a bottle and shouting encouragement to 
his co-defendant at the scene). Therefore, after having received and considered from both 
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parties whether there should be a re-trial for murder or whether the conviction for murder 
should be replaced by a conviction for manslaughter, in April 2016 the Court has issued an 
order directing that Jogee will be re-tried on the charge of murder (with the included 
alternative of manslaughter)
43
. 
In Ruddock, apart from the direction based on the Chan Wing-Siu principle, the summing 
up of the case by the trial judge to the jury was affected by other, unrelated problems. Now 
that the correct position in law has been identified, the Court deemed it unnecessary to 
consider further the consequences of the other defects on the safety of the conviction and 
asked for written submissions from both sides, as to what should be the appropriate disposal 
of the appeal. 
 
4. Conclusions. – The Jogee judgement is a very welcomed counter-revolution after the 
revolution of Chang Wing-Siu. It sets the English law of secondary liability straight, after the 
distortion created by the latter. It corrects what the Law Lords considered to be a «striking 
anomaly», and should be regarded as a proper injustice, as the previous law ended up in 
requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the case of the accessory than in the case of the 
principal, while holding both liable for the same crime of intent. This created unjustified 
disparity, on the one hand, between the secondary and the principal and, on the other hand, 
between the rule for parasitic accessory liability and the rule secondary parties in other cases 
of complicity, which require the intention to assist or encourage the principal to commit the 
crime. 
In Jogee the Court brought the mental element of the secondary party back into broad 
parity with what is required of the principal with effect of narrowing the criminal law by 
demolishing a head of accessory liability
44
, without necessarily weakening the preventive and 
retributive effect of the law of secondary liability. The Court explicitly dismissed the policy 
arguments, advanced in Chan Wing-Siu, based on the need that co-adventurers in crimes 
which result in fatality should not escape conviction, as they did not consider that, in any 
event, the secondary parties would generally be guilty of manslaughter, which carries a 
potential sentence of life imprisonment. The fundamental policy question is rather whether 
and why it was necessary and appropriate to reclassify such conduct as murder rather than 
manslaughter – which involves, among other things, questions about fair labelling and fair 
discrimination in sentencing. 
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The Jogee case might be also an occasion to rethink the Italian law of concorso anomalo. 
Before Jogee, such law presented both elements of similarity and of differentiation with 
the English law of parasitic accessory liability. The similarity consisted in that both legal 
frameworks give raise to the «anomaly» of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the 
case of one party than in the case of the other participant. The difference consisted in that, 
unlike Italian law, the English law based on Chan Wing-Siu did equated foresight, not 
foreseeability, with intention. After the intervention of the UK Supreme Court in Jogee, the 
anomalous and unjust attachment of liability for a crime of intent to the participant who did 
not perpetrate it, nor actually wanted or foresaw it, remains only in the Italian law of 
concorso anomalo, but the clarification by the Law Lords that the test for the responsibility of 
the secondary is objective – that is, based on what a reasonable person would foresee – 
correctly allows for his liability to be founded on foreseeability, other than foresight. 
The Jogee decision prompts important questions on the justness of the Italian law of 
concorso anomalo. If, as acknowledged by Italian courts, the mental state of the participant 
who did not intend the crime committed by another party is negligence, then the time might 
have come for the Italian Parliament to change the law by differentiating the nature of the 
liability of each of the parties involved in a criminal enterprise according to the actual mental 
element they had with respect to the crimes committed. This would imply the possibility of 
considering the participants in the same crime guilty of two different criminal offences: 
respectively of a crime of intent (for the perpetrator who intended it) and the corresponding 
crime of negligence, if any (for the party who should have foreseen it). For instance, in a case 
of homicide, the perpetrator who intends to kill beyond the scope of the common criminal 
venture should be held guilty of intentional homicide (art. 575 c.p.), while the participant 
whose moral or material contribution to that crime is merely negligent should be held guilty 
of negligent homicide (omicidio colposo, art. 589 c.p.). This might put in crisis the dogmatic 
purity of the idea of qualifying the same fact as one single offence, but it would eliminate the 
injustice brought by a form of liability clearly bearing the mark of responsabilità oggettiva 
and, however, perceived and even labelled as «anomalous». 
